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Notes and Comments
Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill
By 4/an Schulkin*
Introduction
Punitive damages' have long been recognized as a means of pun-
ishing malicious,2 reckless, 3 or grossly negligent4 wrongdoing and of
deterring such future actions. Modem products liability and mass dis-
aster litigation threaten, however, to turn punitive damages from a use-
ful tool into a system for overkill, working against society's best
interests by discouraging product development and destroying worth-
while enterprises.5 This Note will examine the danger of overusing pu-
nitive damages and will propose a system that would preserve their
legitimate punitive and deterrent functions while protecting defendants
from uncalled-for devastation.
The Danger
The possibility of massive liability has become clear since courts
began to award damages in products liability cases.6 Before then, puni-
* B.A., 1977, University of Washington. Member, Second Year Class.
1. Punitive damages are also known as exemplary damages. Used correctly, "puni-
tive" would refer to their retributive function and "exemplary" to their deterrent function:
making an example. This Note uses the term punitive to cover both functions. For an
excellent general discussion of punitive damages, see Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort
Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1931).
2. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9-10 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER]; C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 79 (1935).
3. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 251 (1965).
4. Id
5. "A recent problem which has arisen to haunt the courts concerns the 'mass disaster'
litigation, in which the defendant, for example by putting a drug on the market, has caused
injury to a very large number of consumers. How often is such a defendant to be punished?"
PROSSER, supra note 2, § 2, at 13.
6. "In a products liability context [the specter] of punitive damages is particularly
disturbing to the manufacturer who distributes his product to tho-u-sands, and sometimes
millions of users." 3 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 33.01(7), at 302
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tive damages were usually given in cases of the classic intentional torts7
where the tortfeasor demonstrated outrageous conduct against an indi-
vidual. In these cases, one jury would have one plaintiff and one or a
few defendants before it and could decide from its common experience
what amount would be adequate to punish the defendant or defendants
and to deter similar action by these parties and others in the future.
This relative simplicity no longer exists. Consider an inven-
tor/entrepreneur who, seeing the problem of rat infestation in ghettos,
invents an odor-free, easy-to-use, all-electric rat trap. He incorporates
and proceeds to manufacture and market the device. Sales are brisk,
and in one area a local newspaper finds the trap has led to a substantial
reduction in the area's rodent population.
Then chilling reports begin coming in. Three buyers have suffered
serious electrical burns while installing the trap in damp basements.
More reports come in. And then suits are filed: two in California state
courts, three in federal district courts for Illinois, Washington, and Mis-
souri, and another in a Pennsylvania state court. Besides asking for
considerable compensatory awards, all plaintiffs seek high amounts of
punitive damages, alleging that the traps had intentionally been pro-
duced with inadequate insulation in order to save ten percent on pro-
(1978) [hereinafter cited as FRUMER & FRIEDMAN], The first reported instance of punitive
damages in a products liability case was Standard Oil Co. of Kentucky v. Gunn, 234 Ala.
598, 176 So. 332 (1937). Some other examples of products liability cases in which punitive
damages were awarded are Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976) ($100,000); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d
689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) ($250,000); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 11. App. 2d 109, 253
N.E.2d 636 (1969), ard, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970) ($10,000); Ostopowitz v. Win.
S. Merrell Co., No. 5879-1963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Westchester County Jan. 11, 1967), cited in
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra, § 33.01(7), at 304 ($100,000). In some recent cases, juries
have given punitive damage verdicts in amounts that would have been unimaginable a gen-
eration ago. Perhaps the most notorious is Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., No. 197761-
199397 (Cal. Super. Ct., Orange County Feb. 14, 1978), reported in 22 JURY VERDICTS
WEEKLY, No. 14, at 26 (1978), where the jury awarded $125 million in punitive damages for
injuries resulting from the defective design of a Pinto fuel tank. The award was reduced to
$3.5 million by the trial judge, and the case is now on appeal. For other examples of huge
awards see cases cited in Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH.
L. REV. 1257, 1261 n.14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Owen]: Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38
Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974) ($17.25 million; stricken by trial judge);
Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div., No. 202,715 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara County Mar. 8,
1972) afl'd, No. 32,999 Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., Feb. 24, 1976 ($10.5 million, stricken by trial
judge); Hayman v. Arcoa, Inc., Civ. No. 70-3226 (ILL., 20th Jud. Cir., St. Clair County Apr.
30, 1970) ($5 million).
7. For cases awarding punitive damages for intentional torts, see Scott v. Times-Mir-
ror Co., 181 Cal. 345, 184 P. 672 (1919) (libel); Lawrence v. Hagerman, 56 I11. 68 (1870)
(malicious prosecution); Dunham v. Tenth St. Garage & Sales Co., 94 S.W.2d 1096 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1936) (fraud); Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650 (1930) (kidnapping); Hairston
v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 220 N.C. 642, 18 S.E.2d 166 (1942) (assault); Cross v. Camp-
bell, 173 Or. 477, 146 P.2d 83 (1944) (conversion).
[Vol. 30
MASS LIABILITY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
duction costs. Alone, the compensatory damages sought could set the
company's growth back years; two or three punitive damage awards
could bankrupt it.
A products liability case can breed tens, hundreds or even
thousands of different plaintiffs situated throughout the United States,
who may bring suits against the producer in a wide variety of state or
federal courts over a long period of time. A good example is the litiga-
tion surrounding the drug MER/29 which was intended to control cho-
lesterol levels. It caused cataracts as a side effect, and was withdrawn
from the market two years after introduction. Over 1,500 suits were
filed in almost every state and in many different courts, both state and
federal, within most states, and hundreds of claims were disposed of
one way or another short of suit.8 Because no one trial would dispose
of all the claims,9 the defendant would be left open to liability for puni-
tive damages uncontrolled by any one factfinder's determination. If tenjuries feel the proper amount with which to punish the defendant is
fifty thousand dollars, the defendant would be faced with a bill for half
a million dollars, which could cripple his production capacity and force
him into bankruptcy.' 0 Perhaps the product is one that has been or
could be of great benefit to society. While a well-calibrated punitive
award might make the producer perfect the product, an excessive judg-
ment could force a halt to production and deprive society of an impor-
tant new drug," an effective household product, 12 a cheap mode of
8. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story--An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litiga-
tion, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116, 121 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Rheingold]. Another example is
litigation against the A.H. Robins Company, manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, an in-
trauterine contraceptive device. As of 1976, more than 500 suits had been filed, seeking over
$200 million in punitive damages. See Owen, supra note 6, at 1314, 1340-41. In that year,
A.H. Robins had total assets of $200,802,000. See A.H. Robins Co., Inc., Annual Report
1977 (Mar. 27, 1978). As of August 16, 1978, there were at least 153 cases pending in federal
courts alone, seeln re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 453 F. Supp. 108 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1978),
plus an undetermined number of cases in state courts.
9. See text accompanying notes 31-36 supra.
10. In FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 33.01(7), at 310-I1, the authors quote the
trial judge in Ostopowitz v. Wm. S. Merrell Co., No. 5879-1963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Westchester
County Jan. 11, 1967), who reduced the punitive damage verdict which he thought was
excessive because the jury believed it would be the final arbiter of the defendant's punish-
ment: "'If every other jury before whom one of these cases is tried believes the same thing,
the defendant can be destroyed by having their assets parcelled out, in grotesquely dispro-
portionate amounts, among a number of individuals who have already been fully compen-
sated for their injuries. Perhaps this would not be unconstitutional. It would be worse than
that. It would be unjust."' But see Owen, supra note 6, at 1324-25 ("[Tjhe threat of
bankrupting a manufacturer with punitive damages awards in mass disaster litigation ap-
pears to be more theoretical than real.").
11. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); Toole
v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Ostopowitz v.
Wm. S. Merrell Co., No. 5879-1963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Westchester County Jan. 11, 1967), cited
in FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 304 (MER/29).
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transportation,' 3 or a better rat trap.
Judge Friendly recognized the dangers of uncontrolled punitive
damages in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.," 4 one of a series of
cases' 5 dealing with MER/29. He expressed dismay that noncompen-
satory civil liability for an act could far exceed the applicable criminal
penalties. 16 The defendant could in fact be subject to both. 17 Various
fact patterns demonstrate the possibility for this kind of punitive
overkill. Almost any products liability case based on a design rather
than a manufacturing defect presupposes many potential plaintiffs,
whether it involves a defectively designed fuel tank,18 or a caustic drain
cleaner.' 9 A mass disaster, such as a mid-air collision,20 or an oil
spill,2 1 is another obvious example.
The need to place some control on these situations seems apparent,
but a balance must be struck so that the injury will be avoided, and the
development of a beneficial product or service will not be discouraged.
The answer is to restrict the total award to the largest amount that any
one court believes to be proper, and not allow that to be multiplied by
other "proper" awards.
A Proposed Solution
The mechanics of a system to control multiple awards of punitive
damages need not be elaborate. The jury in the first case to come to
trial anywhere in the country, uninformed of other actions pending,
would give whatever punitive award it felt proper according to the
standards set forth in that jurisdiction. That figure would be subject to
the traditional controls of the trial court judge in that jurisdiction-
12. See, e.g., Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 I11. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969),
af'd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970) (drain cleaner).
13. See, e.g., Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976); Grimshaw
v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19776-199397 (Cal. Super. Ct., Orange County Feb. 14, 1978), re-
ported in 22 JURY VERDICTS WEEKLY, No. 14, at 26 (1978) (subcompact automobiles).
14. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
15. See cases cited note 11 supra; Rheingold, supra note 8.
16. 378 F.2d at 839.
17. See text accompanying notes 40-46 infra.
18. See, e.g., Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976); Grimshaw
v. Ford Motor Co., No. 197761-199397 (Cal. Super. Ct., Orange County Feb. 14, 1978),
reported in 22 JURY VERDICTS WEEKLY, No. 14, at 26 (1978).
19. See, e.g., Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 I11. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969),
aftfd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970).
20. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 796 (D. Del. 1961);
Wiener v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 789 (S.D. Cal.), rev'd, 286 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1961);
United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 795 (D. Del. 1959).
21. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); Oppen v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973).
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reduction for lack of relation to the compensatory award,22 for an
amount evidencing prejudice, 23 or for absence of evidence that the de-
fendant acted maliciously or recklessly. When another case based on
the same wrongdoing, against the same defendant, comes to trial, the
second jury would make the same independent determination, as pre-
scribed in that particular jurisdiction. That trial court judge would also
apply his or her discretion to modify the award if necessary. Then, and
only then, he or she would consider the prior punitive damage award
against that defendant for that tort, evidenced by copies of prior judg-
ments supplied by defendant's counsel, and determine whether the
prior awards, in toto, are more or less than the judge and jury would
award. If the prior total is more, or the same, no punitive award would
be given. If the award the judge and jury would grant is greater than
the sum of prior awards, the difference would be granted. Reductions
to offset prior awards would be conditioned on the prior judgments
becoming final. If a judgment which was used as an offset is reversed
on appeal, the award to the later plaintiff for that amount would be
rehabilitated. In that way, no matter how many cases come to trial, the
defendant's punitive damage liability would not exceed the amount
thought proper by the most severe jury, and the defendant would not
fortuitously escape punishment.24
This system could be enacted by Congress under the broad pow-
ers25 granted it by the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce,26
or, more ponderously, by the legislatures of the fifty states.
The worth of this proposal, however, can only be analyzed prop-
erly in light of other possible solutions to the problem. Some alterna-
tives that have been suggested follow.
22. See, e.g., Hartman v. Peterson, 246 Iowa 41, 66 N.W.2d 849 (1954); Mitchell v.
Randal, 288 Pa. 518, 137 A. 171 (1927); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 265 (1965). Many states
do not require a reasonable relation to the compensatory award. See Annot. 17 A.L.R.2d
527 (1951 & Supp. 1973). See also authorities cited note 56 infra.
23. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 266 (1965). Courts have the same power to reduce
excessive punitive damages awards as they do to reduce excessive compensatory damages
awards. See Booth v. Peoples Finance and Thrift Co., 124 Cal. App. 131, 12 P.2d 50 (1932).
24. Professor Owen suggests the need to consider prior awards in awarding punitive
damages. His idea, however, of allowing awards only to the first few plaintiffs, except to the
extent that the award covers the cost of litigation, increases the chances of inadequate pun-
ishment by ignoring the determination of a later, harsher jury, and by giving less flexibility
than the system this Note proposes. See Owen, supra note 6, at 1325.
25. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1 (1824).
26. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (commerce clause).
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Abolition of Punitive Damages
An obvious solution some writers have urged is to abolish punitive
damages entirely,2 7 or make them inapplicable to products liability ac-
tions.2 8 This step would, of course, eliminate the problem of multiple
awards. Although elimination of punitive damages in some contexts
may well seem justified, punitive damages do serve important social
functions, especially in the area of products liability.29
When a tort is totally unrelated to commerce, punitive damages
may be less necessary. When one driver, for instance, behaves reck-
lessly and injures another, he will be subjected to liability for compen-
satory damages. These damages represent an absolute economic loss to
the tortfeasor. The tortfeasor has realized no gain from the incident;
indeed, he probably suffered personal injuries and property damage
himself. The damages will be an out-of-pocket loss, and this alone will
probably serve as adequate impetus for him to be careful in the future.
On the other hand, when torts are commerce-related, compensa-
tory damages may act as no deterrent at all. For instance, if a rat trap
manufacturer designs a trap in a way that would be cheaper but less
safe than otherwise, he is making a conscious trade-off. He hopes that
the compensatory damages resulting from injuries caused by the de-
fects will be less than the profits he saves on the design. In such a
situation, the manufacturer may make a net profit despite widespread
injury and be tempted to repeat his conduct in a subsequent design, or
to retain rather than remedy the initial defect. Without the specter of
punitive damages to remind the manufacturer of the potential net loss,
society could be seriously harmed. 30
27. See, e.g., Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages. An Annotated Argumentative
Outline, 11 FORUM 57 (1975); Duffy, Punitive Damages. A Doctrine Which Should Be Abol-
ished, in The Case Against Punitive Damages 4 (Defense Research Institute monograph
1969).
28. See, e.g., Coccia & Morrissey, Punitive Damages in Product Liabiliti' Cases Should
Not BeAllowed, 22 TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE 46 (1978); Hoenig, Products Liability Problems
and Proposed Reforms, 1977 INS. L.J. 213, 254-55; Snyman, The Validity of Punttive Damages
in Products Liability Cases, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 402 (1977); Tozer, Punitive Damages and
Products Liability, 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 300 (1972).
29. See Owen, supra note 6, at 1325.
30. See Igoe, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases Should Be Allowed, 22
TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE 24, 29 (1978); Owen, supra note 6, at 1282-87. The jury in Grim-
shaw v. Ford Motor Co., No. 197761-199397 (Cal. Super. Ct., Orange County Feb. 14,
1978), reportedin 22 JURY VERDICTS WEEKLY, No. 14, at 26 (1978), based its award of$ 125
million in punitive damages upon testimony on Ford's cost/benefit calculations given by a
retired Ford designer. The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 14, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
"Plaintiffs' attorneys had asked for a punitive award of $100 million, the amount they
estimated Ford had saved by retaining the allegedly defective design on Pintos and other
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
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Consolidation
Another alternative is consolidation of actions. 3' All plaintiffs'
claims would be combined into one action against the defendant. The
judge and the jury would have the entire action in front of them and
the jury could deliver a single, fair verdict. This system has two crip-
pling flaws. First, actions may only be consolidated within a single
court system.32 Although there are provisions to consolidate all federal
court actions, this may only be done by joint action of judges in sepa-
rate districts.3 3 A single district court judge may not affect an action
pending in another district because, although the United States courts
comprise one jurisdiction in terms of their accountability to a single
Congress and Supreme Court, each district is a separate jurisdiction as
small-car models from the time they were introduced until the federally mandated standards
took effect on 1977 cars ....
"[Juror] Greene . . . recalls bringing up the $125 million figure himself. He reasoned
that if Ford had saved $100 million by not installing safe tanks, an award matching that
wouldn't really be punitive. So he added $25 million .... " Id One may argue that if a
manufacturer can predict what the most severe jury would award, it could simply work that
amount, along with potential compensatory liability, into the premarketing cost/benefit
analysis it makes, and thus not be deterred from marketing an unsafe product. Admittedly,
this analysis may occur, but the same would be true under any system that has any measure
of predictability. If, however, the jury bases its award on evidence of management's
cost/benefit calculations, as the Grimshawjury did, the defendant will always be a step be-
hind, and the result would be an escalating spiral much to the defendant's detriment.
31. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1195 (1931).
Professor Morris suggested suspending consideration of punitive damages until all compen-
satory claims are litigated. The inapplicability of this idea to actions brought in many differ-
ent jurisdictions is considered in Note, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 16
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 895, 920 (1976). Professor Morris' premises are criticized in Owen,
supra note 6, at 1324-25.
32. "[W]e are of the view that a cause of action pending in one jurisdiction cannot be
consolidated with a cause of action pending in another jurisdiction." Swindell-Dressler
Corp. v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1962). In this case, two suits were brought in
different federal district courts, both involving the same shipment of damaged machinery.
The court ordered one trial judge to vacate an order of consolidation, as being an act in
excess of his jurisdiction. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE
§§ 12.12, 12.13 (2d ed. 1977); see also Appalachian Power Co. v. Region Properties, Inc., 364
F. Supp. 1273, 1277 (W.D. Va. 1973): "[T]his court has no authority to consolidate an action
of which it has juridiction with one of which it does not."
33. If the actions have been brought in the same district court, Federal Rule 42(a) can
be invoked: "Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." FED. R.
Civ. P. 42(a). When actions are brought in separate districts, the rule must be used in con-
junction with the transfer of venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976), or consolidation may be
had under the comprehensive statute on multidistrict litigation, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
Even in federal court, however, not all cases could be consolidated, because claims arising
out of a single design defect may be brought over a long period of time.
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to its power over persons, property and causes. 34 Furthermore, there is
no power in the court of one state to consolidate a case with one
brought in another state, or in federal court. Likewise, a federal court
may not consolidate a pending case with one pending in state court.
In the rat-trap hypothetical, the Illinois, Washington, and Missouri
cases could be consolidated, but this would leave three distinct actions:
one in California, one in Pennsylvania, and the consolidated federal
case. Any mass disaster case or products liability case is almost certain
to involve complaints filed in federal courts in various districts and also
in various state systems. 35 Such actions may also be brought over a
long period of time. An improperly designed fuel tank in a make of
automobile could cause similar tortious injuries years apart because of
a car's long life.36 For these reasons, consolidation is merely a band-
aid, not a cure. It is a solution only in limited situations.
Dollar Limits
A third suggestion has been to set, statutorily or judicially, a dollar
limit for the size of a punitive damage award made in any single trial.3 7
This method could be grossly unfair to either society or the defendant.
The idea of limitation is based on the assumption that there will be
many awards that will aggregate the penalty. Unless the limit is made
so small as to be virtually insignificant, aggregating many awards for
that amount is not likely to forestall the overkill sought to be avoided.
On the other hand, if relatively few claims are brought, the limit may
be well below that adequate to make the defendant feel the punish-
ment. An award of twenty thousand dollars may effectively deter a
34. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.10 (2d ed. 1977); C. WRIGHT.
FEDERAL COURTS 304-05 (3d ed. 1976).
35. See, e.g., Rheingold, supra note 8, at 121.
36. When the applicable statute of limitations begins to run depends on the theory of
the case. If based on contract-a warranty action-U.C.C. § 2-725(2) would control, with a
four-year limit running from the date of sale. The general rule on tort actions, however, is
that the period begins to run only when the force wrongfully put in motion produces injury.
63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 221 (1972). In California that period is one year. See
G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975). Because
the period begins to run when the injury occurs, statutes of limitations will not prevent
actions on design defects from being brought over long periods of time.
37. Judge Friendly recommended limiting all punitive awards to a certain, small sum
($5-10,000) where mass litigation was threatened. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378
F,2d 832, 840 (2d Cir. 1967). However, in that case New York law was applied and since
Judge Friendly saw no indication that New York would take this step, he overturned the
award on other grounds.
A bill (AB 600) was introduced to the California State Assembly in February of 1979
which would, among other things, limit punitive damages in products liability cases to 10
percent of the defendant's financial worth, or $1 million, whichever is less. See The Re-
corder, Feb. 28, 1979, at 12, col. 8.
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small manufacturer from skimping on the insulation of electric rat
traps in the future, but it would have a negligible effect on a major
automaker.38 This alternative fails because it does not provide individ-
ual treatment, which is the heart of the tradition of punitive damages.
Double Jeopardy
The application of the doctrine of double jeopardy is another sug-
gested means of avoiding subsequent punitive damage awards: 39 the
defendant may not constitutionally be punished for the same act twice.
Such was the contention of counsel for Richardson-Merrell, Inc., in the
MER/29 cases. The defendant "argued that imposition of punitive
damages by a civil jury was so similar to a criminal fine that reasonable
procedural safeguards including a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt and the benefits of double jeopardy provisions should be
required. ' '40 This argument has been rejected by every court that has
heard it, for good reason; double jeopardy applies only to two criminal
prosecutions by the sovereign.41 Neither a completed criminal action,42
nor the potentiality of criminal prosecution,43 will bar receipt of puni-
tive damages. By the same reasoning, the granting of punitive damages
to one plaintiff will not bar the later granting of punitive damages to
another plaintiff for the same act of the defendant.44 Historically, civil
38. California's AB 600, see note 37 supra, would prevent adequate punishment of the
largest corporations, with punitive damages awards in no case being greater than $1 million.
For example, in the year the jury in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., No. 197761-199397 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Orange County Feb. 14, 1978), reportedin 22 JURY VERDICTS WEEKLY, No. 14,
at 26 (1978), assessed Ford Motor Co. with $125 million in punitive damages, that amount
roughly equalled one month of Ford profits. The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 14, 1978, at I,
col. 4. Against this level of earnings, a $1 million award could hardly be expected to have
much deterrent force.
39. See, e.g., Ford, The Constitutionality ofPunitive Damages in The Case Against Pu-
nitive Damages 15 (Defense Research Institute monograph 1969).
40. Rheingold, supra note 8, at 135.
41. "It is a basic principle that the doctrine of double jeopardy, in either its constitu-
tional or its common-law sense, has a strict application to criminal proceedings only, and
does not apply to civil actions .... 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 240 (1961). See also One
Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236 (1972); Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391 (1938).
42. See Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948); Bundy v. Maginess, 76
Cal. 532, 18 P. 668 (1888).
43. See Shelley v. Clark, 267 Ala. 621, 103 So. 2d 743 (1958); Miller v. Blanton, 213
Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948); Muenkel v. Muenkel, 143 Minn. 29, 173 N.W. 184 (1919);
Security Aluminum Window Mfg. Corp. v. Lehman Assoc., Inc., 108 N.J. Super. 137, 260
A.2d 248 (1970).
44. The MER/29 cases are an example of where a second court has allowed punitive
damages to stand where another court had already awarded them to another plaintiff. See
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) (affirming
trial court's reduced punitive damage award of $250,000); Ostopowitz v. Win. S. Merrell
Co., No. 5879-1963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Westchester County Jan. 11, 1967) citedin FRUMER &
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actions have not been included under the umbrella of double jeop-
ardy,45 and to date few courts have held otherwise.4 6
Jury Discretion
One possibility for preventing excessive punitive damages is sim-
ply to let the jury decide how much it should contribute to the defend-
ant's total punishment in the course of all litigation after informing it of
any prior punitive damage awards and any other pending actions. The
jury might then do any subtraction it wishes after it has concluded that
the defendant is liable. This course, however, is impossible to adminis-
ter, is perhaps prejudicial, and in form subverts the purpose of punitive
damages. First, the jury would be forced to predict the outcome of
subsequent actions47 in order to fairly apportion an assumed "total"
award to a particular plaintiff; it must foresee all suits which will result
in the future from the wrongdoing in question,48 as well as consider
those being adjudicated and those already adjudicated.
Second, informing the jury could prejudice it by encouraging it to
"jump on the bandwagon," or to show provincial bias. It may be
FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 33.01(7), at 304 (granting punitive damages of $100,000 reduced
from jury's verdict of $850,000).
45. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964); United States v.
Grannis, 172 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1949); Kelley v. Atwell, 59 Mich. App. 219, 229 N.W.2d
387 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976); State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. 571, 311 A.2d 300
(1973); Dep't of Conservation and Economic Dev. v. Scipio, 88 N.J. Super. 315, 212 A.2d
184 (1965). Dictum supporting an exception is found in United States v. Dickerson, 168 F.
Supp. 899 (D.D.C. 1958), rev'd, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959) in which the court says that
any proceeding that may deprive a person of his liberty is covered by double jeopardy re-
strictions. But the court did not decide whether the juvenile proceeding involved was civil or
criminal.
46. Noting that the concept of double jeopardy arose to meet inadequacies in criminal
law and procedure, one author writes: "The current meaning of double jeopardy as a crimi-
nal doctrine should be retained rather than extending the doctrine into the area of tort law
J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 225 (1969). Contra, Ford, The Coistitutionalitl of
Punitive Damages in The Case Against Punitive Damages 15, 17-20 (Defense Research In-
stitute monograph 1969). A few states have disallowed punitive damages where criminal
prosecution would also lie. See Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884); Louisville,
N.A. and C. Ry. v. Wolfe, 128 Ind. 347, 27 N.E. 606 (1890); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342
(1872).
47. Attempting such prediction is criticized at text accompanying notes 71-78 infra.
48. Judge Friendly commended the trial judge in Roginsky for attempting to get the
jury to take a broad view of the litigation by "instructing the jury that it 'may consider the
potentially wide effect of the actions of the corporation and, on the other hand . . . the
potential number of actions similar to this one to which that wide effect may render the
defendant subject.'" Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-40 (2d Cir.
1967). But Judge Friendly rejected the efficacy of this approach, saying that "it is hard to see
what even the most intelligent jury would do with this, being inherently unable to know
what punitive damages, if any, other juries in other states may award other plaintiffs in
actions yet untried." Id
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swayed to make a punitive award when it otherwise might not have by
the knowledge that another jury has found the defendant's conduct
worthy of punishment.49 Or the prospect of depriving a local plaintiff
may lead the jury to ignore a prior award in another state.
In Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrel, Inc.,50 the court said:
[W]e think it somewhat unrealistic to expect a judge, say in New
Mexico, to tell a jury that their fellow townsman should get very little
by way of punitive damages because Toole in California and Rogin-
sky and Mrs. Ostopowitz in New York had stripped that cupboard
bare... and still more unrealistic to expect that the jury would fol-
low such an instruction or that, if they didn't, the judge would reduce
the award below what had become the going rate.51
Such concerns should be irrelevant to the jury's determination.
Third, asking the jury to decide how much of defendant's punish-
able conduct was directed against the plaintiff confuses the concepts of
Unitive and compensatory damages. An example of this confusion is
ound in Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc. ,52 in which the court insisted
the plaintiff could not recover punitive damages representing the im-
pact of a defective drug "on the whole of society.' ' 53 Rather, the court
held, the punitive damage figure "must be a reasonable sum in relation
to the defendant's conduct vis-h-vis the plaintiff. S4
This view is mistaken. Punitive damages do not "relate" to com-
pensation of a particular plaintiff. Rather, they are concerned only
with the conduct of the defendant and are awarded because the deter-
rent effect provides a general benefit to society.55 Dangerous conduct
should be subject to punitive damages even if no injury or an insignifi-
cant injury occurs. States that require a reasonable relation between
compensatory and punitive damages56 misapprehend the function of
punitive damages.57 Any benefit to the particular plaintiff is inciden-
49. Professor Morris suggests informing the jury of a prior award as a minimum guard
against punitive overkill, but adds that such an admonition is just as likely to place the
defendant in a worse light in the jury's eyes. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1195 n.40 (1931). See also Note, Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Cases, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 895, 919-21 (1976).
50. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
51. Id at 840. That final comment about the local judge's hesitance would not be valid
under the proposed system because the judge would have no option. He would merely be
making a subtraction with figures known to all parties. If the subtraction is left to the jury,
the amount it used as a setoff would remain a mystery.
52. 374 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
53. Id at 856.
54. Id
55. See, e.g., Garland Coal and Mining Co. v. Few, 267 F.2d 785, 790 (10th Cir. 1959);
J.C. Penney Co. v. O'Daniell, 263 F.2d 849, 851 (10th Cir. 1959); Morris v. Board of Educ.,
401 F. Supp. 188, 215 n.39 (D. Del. 1975).
56. See Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 527 (1951 & Supp. 1973).
57. See Comment, Required Ratio ofActual to Exemplary Damage, 25 BAYLOR L. REV.
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tal.58 When juries begin carving punitive awards into percentages that
represent the defendant's misdeed against a particular plaintiff, the
award loses its punitive character and takes on that of compensation.
Evaluation of the Proposed System
Plaintiffs' Rights
One objection to a system for limiting punitive damages is that
such a system would violate the rights of plaintiffs.59 However, there is
no "right" to punitive damages. Courts60 and writers6' agree that the
awarding of punitive damages lies completely in the discretion of the
trier of fact, and regardless of the circumstances, legislatures may re-
strict awards of punitive damages. Furthermore, there is no vested
right to collect such damages until they are actually awarded. 62
Essentially, punitive damages are a windfall to the plaintiff,63 be-
ing exacted for the benefit of society, not for reasons of individual com-
pensation.64 The weakness of a plaintiffs claim to punitive damages is
further evidenced by the unwillingness of the courts to reverse a puni-
127 (1973); Comment, The Relationship of Punitive Damages and Compensatory Damages in
TortActions, 75 DICK. L. REV. 585 (1971); Comment, The Reasonable Ratio Between Exem-
plary andActual Damages in Texas, 10 Hous. L. REV. 131 (1972). "The ratio requirement
diverts attention from the nature of the defendant's conduct and from the need to discourage
similar conduct in the future. By focusing attention on the specific harm that resulted from
the defendant's conduct, a ratio requirement points to a false guide for effective punishment
and results in an injustice." Id. at 137.
58. See Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F. Supp. 482, 490 (D. Del. 1974), afid, 529 F.2d 511(3d Cir. 1975).
59. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
60. See, e.g., Stoody Co. v. Royer, 374 F.2d 672, 680 (10th Cir. 1967); Denham v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 415 F. Supp. 530, 535 (W.D. Okla. 1976); White v. B.K. Truck-
ing Co., 405 F. Supp. 1068, 1071 (W.D. Okla. 1975); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Street,
164 Ala. 155, 158-59, 51 So. 306, 307 (1910); Smith v. Hill, 12 I1. 2d 588, 595, 147 N.E.2d
321, 325 (1958).
61. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 2, § 2, at 13; C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES
§ 84 (1935).
62. "[T]he plaintiff is without legal right to [punitive damages], as that right attaches to
actual damages suffered. . . . Such damages may be even forbidden, or affirmatively with-
held, by legislative enactment, so far as impinging rights of property are concerned. In
short, such damages, until a vested property right attaches to them through a judgment
rendered in a party's favor, are not properly within the protection of Constitutions." Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R. v. Street, 164 Ala. 155, 157, 51 So. 306, 307 (1910) (citations omitted).
See also Smith v. Hill, 12 111. 2d 588, 147 N.E.2d 321 (1958); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 238
(1965).
63. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Graco, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 155, 158 (D. Colo. 1977); PROSSER,
supra note 2, § 2, at 13; Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173,
1196 (1931).
64. Probably the best use to which punitive damages could be put is a common fund
used to help correct the defendant's misdeed to society as a whole, as with "fluid recoveries"
in class action suits. Consideration of that possibility is beyond the scope of this Note.
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tive damage award, at the plaintiffs behest, for inadequacy.65 For the
above reasons, limiting the chances of later plaintiffs to recover puni-
tive damages does not deprive them of a personal or property right, and




The proposed system has many characteristics that make it prefer-
able both to the chaos that now exists and to the other reforms sug-
gested. One benefit is that the determination of what a just punishment
should be is left in the hands of the jury. Though much has been said
to denigrate the wisdom of using juries in civil trials,67 the old justifica-
tions still apply,68 and recent studies have reaffirmed the jury's compe-
tence.69 The law has always left the power to grant punitive damages
65. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Street, 164 Ala. 155, 51 So. 306 (1910); 1 G.
PARMELE, DAMAGE VERDICTS 14 (1927); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 266 (1965).
66. It could be argued that without the "jackpot" of punitive damages to make a case
financially attractive to a lawyer, later plaintiffs will lose the opportunity to recover even
compensatory damages because they will never get into court. This argument, however, is
just as true in any negligence action where the victim's damages are small. The answer is
not to let punitive damages remain wildly out of hand, but to adopt the English custom of
awarding attorney's fees in successful actions. See, e.g., McLaughlin, The Recovery of,4ttor-
ney'r Fees: .A New Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (1972);
Taylor, I'r Time to Allow Recovery of Attorney's Fees to the Prevailing Party in Any Civil
Case, 2 ORANGE COUNTY B.J. 645 (1975).
67. See, e.g., Harley, Where Jury Trial Fails, 55 JUDICATURE 94 (1971) (reprint of a
1925 article); Helwig, The American Jury System:A Timefor Reexamination, 55 JUDICATURE
96 (1971); Landis, Jury Trials and the Delay ofJustice, 56 A.B.A.J. 950 (1970); Steuer, The
Case Against the Jury, 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 101 (1975); New York Times, Nov. 15, 1970, at 32,
col. 1 (comments of Chief Justice Burger).
68. The first justification is delivery of a verdict reflecting a common sense of justice.
Note the instructions of post-Revolutionary War Judge Dudley of New Hampshire: "A clear
head and an honest heart are wuth [sic] more than all the law of all the lawyers. . . . It's
our business to do justice between the parties; not by any quirks of the law out of Coke or
Blackstone-books that I never read and never will-but by common sense and common
honesty between man and men. . . . Give us an honest verdict that common sense men
needn't be ashamed on." F. AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 40 n. 118
(1969). Other justifications are the jury's advantage over a judge in reflecting current com-
munity values; the jury's function as a buffer between the state and the people; the benefit of
size and diversity in making factfinding decisions; and the jury's function of spreading re-
sponsibility. See comments of Lord Brougham in M. LESSER, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM 223-24 (1894). See also L. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS,
PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 157-82 (1973).
69. See Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation f Judi-
cialPower, 56 TEX. L. REV. 47 (1977); Janata, The Pros and Cons fJury Trials, 11 FORUM
590 (1976); Miller, Some Thoughts on the Jury System, 41 KENTUCKY BENCH & BAR, July
1977, at 17; Ross, The Civil Jury System: An Essential of Justice-Preserve It (Defense
Research Institute monograph 1971); Note, The Jury: Is It Viable, 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
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to the jury, probably because the punishment should relate to the pre-
vailing ethics of the community.70 Otherwise, the decision will be held
up to public contempt, and will be more likely to spur resistance to the
law than a change in conduct. The jury is able to individualize treat-
ment. It looks only to the facts before it and can judge what is proper
for the given circumstances.
No Need to Predict
This proposal would leave the determination of adequate punish-
ment within the province of the jury,7' as controlled by the trial judge,
and there would be no need for juries, judges, or legislators to predict
how many actions will be brought for any given wrongdoing. Judge
Friendly correctly points out that such prediction is impossible. 72 Set-
ting a maximum figure requires legislators to know how many actions
are going to be tried in any given fact situation. Even the kind of
wrongs that might occur involving outrageous conduct is completely
unknown. Also, under the present system, individual judges must try
to predict whether there will be additional cases, and how many, and
how much may be awarded in them.73 The task would be an exercise
in futility.
Attempts at prediction threaten to let a defendant avoid adequate
punishment. For example, two judges in the MER/29 cases reduced
punitive damage awards because of the possibility of multiple liability.
The California judge in Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc. 74 cut the puni-
tive damages verdict of $500,000 to $250,000 because many untried
cases were pending;75 the New York judge in Ostopowitz v. Win. S.
Merrell Co. 76 reduced the $850,000 punitive damages award to
897, 901 (1972) (citing the University of Chicago Jury Project); Comment, Criminal Safe-
guards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 408, 418-22 (1967).
70. "The need for the popular and nonprofessional perspective which the jury brings to
the courtroom is particularly acute where punitive damages are involved, because it is upon
contemporary community standards that conduct is judged as wanton, grossly negligent,
outrageous, or malicious-and thus a proper basis for punitive damages. The jury is also
said to be particularly suited for setting the penalty for such conduct: '[Tihe amount
awarded is limited by the common conscience which is called into play by the jury system."'
Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REv.
408, 420-21 (1967).
71. See text accompanying notes 47-58 supra.
72. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967).
73. See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1967); Ostopowitz v. Wm. S. Merrell Co., No. 5879-1963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Westchester
County Jan. 11, 1967), cited in FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 33.01(7), at 304.
74. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
75. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 834 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967).
76. No. 5879-1963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Westchester County Jan. 11, 1967), citedin FRUMER
& FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 33.01(7), at 304.
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$100,000 because the jury would not know of other cases pending.77
Consequently, only two punitive awards survived the appellate courts
for a total ($350,000) that might reasonably be considered inadequate
for the seriousness of the wrongdoings involved.78
There is no way of knowing how many actions will arise in any
products liability or mass disaster tort until the last injury is suffered
and the last statute of limitations has passed. Only then can any rea-
sonable prediction be made of punitive damage liability, but by then it
is too late to protect either the defendant or the interests of society.
Adequate Punishment Provided
Although the advocated system's chief purpose is to protect de-
fendants from unwarranted liability, it also acts to insure that each de-
fendant will be sufficiently punished, which a flat-sum limit, whether
imposed by a legislature or an individual judge, could not do.79 Under
the suggested system, one trial would produce adequate punishment.
Subsequent actions would increase that punishment only if the isolated
jury felt more severe punishment was due, but credit would be given
for the first award. The defendant would not be prejudiced if the firstjury it faces is relatively severe. Conversely, it would not be fortui-
tously benefited if the first jury is unusually lenient. The award
thought proper by the harshest jury to consider the question will ulti-
mately be the amount of the defendant's total punitive liability.
Diligent Plainft Rewarded
One element that might seem to be a flaw-that the earlier plain-
tiffs receive more benefit-is actually an asset. The plaintiff who is the
most diligent in prosecuting an action will be the most rewarded. If
two plaintiffs are fated to receive jury verdicts for punitive damages of
$50,000 each, that plaintiff who pushes his case to judgment first will
receive the full amount, the second nothing.
The benefit of being early extends past the race for the first judg-
ment. Every plaintiff who is earlier than the next will be in a more
favorable position throughout the course of the litigation as a whole.
77. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 n.9. See generally
Rheingold, supra note 8, at 136-37.
78. Two separate juries felt so-the Toolejury which awarded $500,000 and the Oslo-
powitz jury which awarded $850,000-and neither trial judge indicated that the awards
should be reduced as evidencing passion or prejudice. If those judges could have applied
the proposed system, they would not have had to predict the outcome of future or pending
actions. Toole would have received $500,000 in punitive damages while Ostopowitz would
have received $350,000, and Richardson-Merrell, with assets estimated at $150-200 million,
see Rheingold, supra note 8, at 135, would have been more adequately punished.
79. See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
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Promptness will continue to be preferred. One writer has encouraged
such a preference in the products liability context because of
the enormous diligence, imagination, and financial outlay required
of initial plaintiffs to uncover and to prove the flagrant misconduct of
a product manufacturer. In fact, subsequent plaintiffs will often ride
to favorable verdicts and settlements on the coattails of the
firstcomers. . . [T]he initial plaintiffs in appropriate cases should re-
ceive punitive damages awards that reward their efforts.80
The preference will discourage delays by plaintiffs' counsel intended to
let other litigants blaze trails, uncover information, and give a better
opportunity to gauge the settlement value of a claim. Such delays clog
the court system, 8' and the resulting prompt resolution of disputes out-
weighs any effect this procedure might have in encouraging litigation.
Flexibilifty
The proposed system does not interfere with the traditional discre-
tionary powers of trial judges to identify an award as excessive and
order a remittitur. It reinforces and augments that tradition. The judge
may still remit for reasons of passion and prejudice,8 2 but must now
also remit to offset a prior award.
The offset for a prior award is not based on a verdict, but on a
judgment. The second judge will only look at the actual judgment in
the first action-that is, the combination of jury determination and ju-
dicial modification-not the jury verdict. Likewise, if there is a new
judgment on appeal or on new trial in the first action, the offset amount
considered in the second action becomes the more recent punitive dam-
ages award in the first action. This result follows because the initial
judgment is eradicated upon the granting of a motion for a new trial, or
upon judgment on appeal.8 3 Although in some situations this proce-
dure could introduce an element of randomness as to which plaintiffs
actually receive awards, such randomness is irrelevant to the purpose of
punitive damages.
In action I the plaintiff might receive a punitive damage judgment
of $50,000. In action 2, if the jury awards the plaintiff $50,000 in puni-
tive damages the "second" plaintiff will of course receive none of that.
Subsequent to judgment in action 2, the judgment in action 1 may be
reversed. So the punitive damages in action 2 would be rehabilitated
and the plaintiff could receive the entire $50,000. In this manner, ade-
80. Owen, supra note 6, at 1325.
81. See Tauro, Court Delay and the Trial Bar-One Judge's Opinion, in SELECTED
READINGS: COURT CONGESTION AND DELAY 52 (G. Winters ed. 1971). Contra, Zeisel,
Court Delay Caused by the Bar?, in id. at 57.
82. Remittitur is recognized to be in the realm of the trial judge's discretion. 22 Am.
JUR. 2D Damages § 266 (1965); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 126(1) (1966).
83. See 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 465 (1969).
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quate punishment of the defendant for society's benefit is assured, the
court has a solid basis for avoiding overkill, and the court has not been
forced to predict the outcome of future actions.
Settlements
Settlements can be worked into the system as offset amounts only
if embodied in consent judgments. If a defendant settles with plaintiff
I for $100,000 without breaking down that amount into individual ele-
ments, there is no way of knowing what portion of that sum represents
potential punitive damage liability. If a settlement specifies its ele-
ments, for example by stating that $50,000 represents compensatory lia-
bility and $50,000 represents punitive damage liability, that
specification alone is not helpful because of the opportunity for fraud
by the defendant. Under present tax law it is irrelevant to the first
plaintiff whether his money is called "punitive" or "compensatory," as
neither type of award is includible as gross income to a personal injury
plaintiff.8 4 Therefore, a defendant could request or require an inflated
punitive designation to shield itself from punitive damage liability in
future actions, and the plaintiff would be glad to acquiesce at a price.
If, however, the settlement is embodied in a consent judgment, a
judge will pass on the settlement and determine whether the percentage
designated as punitive damage liability is a reasonable one. The judge
could refuse to enter judgment on a settlement that does not give a fair
detailing. Because of the adequate controls, the element of such a set-
tlement designated as punitive could be used in subsequent actions as
an offset.85
Conclusion
The proposed system would be most effective if enacted by Con-
gress because of the uniform application that would result. However,
each state that takes the initiative of adopting the system on its own
84. Under the reasoning of Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955),
which held includible in gross income punitive damages for fraud and the punitive two-
thirds of an antitrust treble damages recovery, all punitive damages appeared to be includ-
ible as gross income. A recent Revenue Ruling, however, states that "any damages, whether
compensatory or punitive received on account of personal injuries or sickness are excludable
from gross income." Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
85. If Rev. Rul. 75-45, see note 84 supra, is ever overturned, a settlement alone could
provide an offset amount. The plaintiff would want his settlement denominated as compen-
satory damages, which for personal injuries are tax exempt- See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). The
defendant, on the other hand, would want a portion identified as punitive damages so that it
could be offset against a future punitive damage award. Since both sides would negotiate
out of self-interest, fraud by the defendant could be avoided without judicial intervention.
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would be taking a useful step toward limiting multiple punitive
damages.
With adequate punishment assured, manufacturers, airlines, ri-
parian industries, and other potential mass tortfeasors will be en-
couraged to mend their ways while not eliminating the social good they
perform. As one writer stated: "Business firms are in the business of
making money; to the extent that they cannot make money through
defective products or intentional unavoidance of injury, they will with
alacrity join the forces of the law in reducing the long history of indus-
trial and public carnage extant in America. '86
86. Igoe, Punitive Damages: An Analytical Perspective, 14 TRIAL, Nov. 1978, at 48, 49.
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